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Tirole (1988, pp. 291-294) presents a model of duopolists (푖 = 1, 2) located on the ends
of a Hotelling line who chose advertising (Φ푖) and price (푝푖) simultaneously, and derives
the pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium. The purpose is pedagogical, partly to highlight
the forces that could lead to excessive or insufficient advertising. Tirole (1988) notes that
“these conclusions, of course, are only valid in the competitive range,” i.e., only to the extent
that a competitive equilibrium exists and so assumptions are made to ensure the existence of
the equilibrium.1 Here, it is shown that such an outcome exists.
1. TIROLE’S MODEL
Consumers are distributed uniformly along a unit length with density 1, have unit demand
with gross surplus 푠 from consuming the good. They have linear transportation cost 푡. They
do not know of the existence of either product unless they receive an ad from a firm; then
they learn that firm’s location and price. Advertising Φ푖 is the fraction of consumers that
firm 푖 reaches with an advertisement. Consumers have equal chances of receiving a given
ad (implicitly this is independent of each firm). The cost to firm 푖 to reach the fraction Φ푖
of the consumers is quadratic: 퐴(Φ푖) = 푎Φ
2
푖
∕2. Tirole (1988, Ch.7, Fn. 27) assumes that
푎 > 푡∕2 so that the firms choose in equilibrium Φ < 1.
Assumption 1. 푎 > 푡∕2.
Production is on demand with constant marginal cost 푐. Implicitly it is assumed that all
potential exchanges are efficient: 푠 − 푐 − 푡 ≥ 0.
For the consumers firm 1 reaches, a fraction 1−Φ2 are not reached by its rival and so firm
1 is a monopolist in this case. For the remaining fraction of consumers that firm 1 reaches,
they are reached by firm 2, which occurs with probability Φ2. These latter consumers are
fully informed and the demand for firm 1 in this case is presented as (Tirole, 1988, p. 293,
top col. 1)
(푝2 − 푝1 + 푡)∕2푡.
2
Thus, demand for firm 1 is (Tirole, 1988, p. 293, col. 1: 퐷1)
퐷1 = Φ1
[
(1 − Φ2) × 1 + Φ2
(푝2 − 푝1 + 푡)
2푡
]
. (1)
1.1. Competitive Equilibrium. Profit for firm 1 is (Tirole, 1988, p. 293)
Φ1
[
(1 − Φ2) × 1 + Φ2
(푝2 − 푝1 + 푡)
2푡
]
(푝1 − 푐) − 푎
Φ2
1
2
(2)
Differentiating with respect to 푝푖 and Φ푖 and imposing symmetry yields the competitive
equilibrium price (with the equation numbering as in Tirole, 1988 to ease comparison)
푝푐 = 푐 + (2푎푡)
1∕2, (7.15)
and the competitive equilibrium advertising
Φ푐 =
2
1 + (2푎∕푡)1∕2
. (7.16)
Substituting these equilibrium values into the profit expression (2) yields the competitive
equilibrium profit for firm 1
Π푐 =
2푎
(1 + (2푎∕푡)1∕2)2
. (7.17)
1For example, Tirole (1988, Fn. 27), notes that advertising costs cannot be “too high” in order to rule out a
firm’s incentive to charge a high price and focus “on one’s own turf.”
2More precisely, since the maximum demand is 1 and the minimum is 0, the demand function is
min
{
1,max
{
0, (푝2 − 푝1 + 푡)∕2푡
}}
, but this is implicit given earlier derivations in (Tirole, 1988, p. 98). For
ease in following the derivations in Tirole (1988), expressions here follow those in Tirole (1988).
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This pure strategy symmetric equilibrium is the only equilibrium presented in Tirole (1988),
though of course others may exist.
Returning to the demand function (1), there is another standard assumption (implicitly)
made. For the consumers that firm 1 reaches, who are not reached by firm 2, firm 1 is a
monopolist. Given reaching these consumers, the demand in this case is assumed equal to 1:
the 1 in (1 − Φ2) × 1 on the RHS of (1). This means that conditional on the firm reaching
the consumer and its rival not reaching the consumer, the firm has a sale with probability 1,
that is, all consumers accept the offer (in contrast, for the second term the firm may only
sell to a fraction of the consumer it reaches). This is a variation of the “covered market”
assumption and implies that the 푠 is large enough and 푡 is low enough so that the furthest
consumer purchases. This implies that the competitive equilibrium price (denoted 푝푐 in
(7.15)) is such that the furthest consumer buys.3
Assumption 2. Covered Market Assumption: 푝 ≤ 푠 − 푡.
1.2. Welfare Optimum. The planner chooses Φ (that is, the planner has both firms set the
same level) to maximize (Tirole, 1988, Fn. 29, p. 294)4
Φ2(푠 − 푐 − 푡∕4) + 2Φ(1 − Φ)(푠 − 푐 − 푡∕2) − 2
(
푎Φ2∕2
)
.
The first term reflects when a consumer receives ads from both firms. Their average trans-
portation cost is 푡∕4. When they receive only one ad, their average transportation cost is
1∕2. The maximization yields (Tirole, 1988, Fn. 29)
Φ∗ =
2(푠 − 푐) − 푡
2(푠 − 푐) − 3푡∕2 + 2푎
. (3)
Intuitively, Φ∗ is increasing in 푠 and straightforward calculus confirms this.
1.3. Two Implications.
Lemma 1. Given Assumptions 1 and 2, the equilibrium price (7.15) implies that 푐 + 2푡 ≤ 푠.
Proof. Combining the equilibrium price (7.15) and Assumptions 2 we have
푐 + (2푎푡)
1∕2
≤ 푠 − 푡.
Solving for 푎 obtains
푎 ≤
(푠 − 푡 − 푐)2
2푡
. (4)
From Assumption 1, (4) becomes
푡
2
< 푎 ≤
(푠 − 푡 − 푐)2
2푡
푡
2
<
(푠 − 푡 − 푐)2
2푡
.
Solving for 푠 yields
푐 + 2푡 ≤ 푠.

Note that Lemma 1 is a necessary condition, but not necessarily a sufficient one. Lemma
1, in turn, has an implication regarding the monopoly price.
Lemma 2. The monopoly price is the corner solution: 푝푚 = 푠 − 푡.
3The assumption could also be inferred from the statement Tirole (1988, Bottom p. 292, col. 2) “we look at
equilibria with overlapping market areas for firms among the fully informed consumers.”
4Implicitly it is assumed that the price the planner sets is such that all consumers are willing to buy since all
potential exchanges are assumed efficient.
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Proof. From Lemma 1
푠 ≥ 푐 + 2푡
푠 − 2푡 ≥ 푐
2푠 − 2푡 ≥ 푠 + 푐
푠 − 푡 ≥
푠 + 푐
2
,
with the RHS of the last inequality being the solution to the monopoly profit-maximization
problem assuming an interior solution to the concave problem (that is, at that price not all
consumers buy). (Though straightforward, for completeness the derivation of this price
is in Appendix A). Given that quantity demanded at 푝 = 푠 − 푡 equals 1, so too is quantity
demanded at the lower price (푠 + 푐)∕2 (that is, at the latter price quantity demanded is
bounded by the unit length of the city). And so, profits are greater at 푝 = 푠 − 푡. 
2. EXISTENCE OF SOCIALLY INSUFFICIENT ADVERTISING IN EQUILIBRIUM
2.1. The condition for socially insufficient advertising. Intuitively, there is insufficient
advertising when 푠 is sufficiently large: as 푠 increases, the planner values advertising more,
but increases in 푠 do not affect the competitive equilibrium level of advertising (7.16).
Lemma 3. For there to be socially insufficient advertising, 푠 must be greater than
푠
∗
≡
(푐 + 푡∕2)((2푎∕푡)1∕2 − 1) + 2푎 − 푡∕2
(2푎∕푡)1∕2 − 1
. (5)
Proof. Differencing the socially optimal level of advertising (3) from (7.16) yields
Φ∗ − Φ푐 = 2
(2푎∕푡)1∕2(2푠 − 2푐 − 푡) − 2(푠 − 푐 − 푡) − 4푎
(4푠 − 4푐 − 3푡 + 4푎)[1 + (2푎∕푡)1∕2]
,
which, since Φ∗ is increasing in 푠 while Φ푐 is constant in 푠, is increasing in 푠. Solving for 푠
such that the above is zero obtains
(푐 + 푡∕2)((2푎∕푡)1∕2 − 1) + 2푎 − 푡∕2
(2푎∕푡)1∕2 − 1
≡ 푠
∗
.
Note that since by Assumption 1 푎 > 푡∕2, then (2푎∕푡)1∕2 − 1 > 0. This ensures that
푠
∗
> 0. 
2.2. A necessary condition for the existence of a competitive equilibrium. When con-
sidering a candidate equilibrium of price and advertising levels, one possible deviation for a
firm is to set a higher price. As the partial derivative
휕2휋푖(푝1,푝2,Φ1,Φ2)
휕푝2
푖
= −
Φ1Φ2
푡
is negative,
no prices that are accepted by some contested buyers can dominate the candidate equilibrium
price 푝푐 in (7.15), in the candidate equilibrium. The focus can be restricted for prices that
are only accepted by (some of) the captive buyers of the seller charging them, assuming that
the competitor’s does set price 푝푐 . From Lemma 2 the monopoly price is 푝푚 = 푠 − 푡. As 푠
increases, the monopoly price becomes more profitable, while the competitive equilibrium
price does not change (7.15) and so the competitive equilibrium profit (7.17) does not change.
Thus, there exists a sufficiently large 푠 at which the firm would deviate so long as Φ푐 < 1,
which is ensured by Assumption 1. Specifically, if firm 푖 deviates to 푠 − 푡 its profit, given
Assumption 2, is
Π푚 ≡ Φ푐(1 − Φ푐)(푠 − 푡 − 푐) − 푎
Φ푐
2
. (6)
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Let 푠
푚
denote the 푠 such that deviating to the monopoly price is more profitable (and so the
competitive equilibrium does not exist). That is, for 푠 ≥ 푠
푚
, Π푚 ≥ Π푐 . That is, a necessary,
but not necessarily sufficient condition for the competitive equilibrium is that
Lemma 4. For a firm not to deviate from the competitive price, 푠 must be less than
푠̂ ≡
2푎 + (푐 + 푡)((2푎∕푡)1∕2 − 1)
(2푎∕푡)1∕2 − 1
. (7)
Proof. The competitive equilibrium price is dominated by the monopoly price whenever
(6) is greater than (7.17), or subtracting the latter from the former, when the following is
positive
Π푚 − Π푐 = 2
[(2푎∕푡)1∕2 − 1](푠 − 푐 − 푡) − 푎
[1 + (2푎∕푡)1∕2]2
,
which is increasing in 푠. Solving for the 푠 such this is zero obtains
푠̂ ≡
2푎 + (푐 + 푡)((2푎∕푡)1∕2 − 1)
(2푎∕푡)1∕2 − 1
.
For 푠 > 푠̂, Π푚 ≥ Π푚 > Π푐 , and the firm would deviate from the competitive price. 
Since as 푠 increases deviating to the monopoly price becomes more attractive and the
social planner would have more advertising, it is possible that the 푠 sufficient for the social
planner to choose more advertising than the competitive equilibrium would imply that
the competitive equilibrium does not exist as firms would deviate to the monopoly price.
However, this is not true: at 푠∗ the competitive equilibrium still exists.
Proposition 1. For Tirole’s competitive equilibrium in a Hotelling model of advertising,
advertising is socially insufficient when 푠 ∈ [푠̂, 푠∗) and the set is not empty.
Proof. Subtracting (7) from (5) yields
푠∗ − 푠̂ = −
(2푎푡)1∕2
2[(2푎∕푡)1∕2) − 1]
< 0.
The inequality follows as the denominator is positive since by Assumption 1, 푎 > 푡∕2. Thus,
푠∗ < 푠̂ ≥ 푠
푚
. 
That is, the 푠 needed for socially insufficient advertising in the competitive equilibrium
is greater than the maximum 푠 possible for a firm not to deviate from the competitive
equilibrium price.
The intuition for the result is straightforward. The competitive equilibrium price and
advertising levels are independent of 푠. However, larger 푠 increases the social return from
advertising; as 푠 increases, the planner would increase the level of advertising. Thus, there is
a threshold 푠, 푠∗, such that if 푠 is greater than this, then there would be insufficient advertising
in the candidate equilibrium if it exists. However, as 푠 increases, the incentives to deviate to
the monopoly price increase. For this model and its assumptions, the 푠 at which the firm
would deviate from the equilibrium price is greater than 푠∗, and so a range exists in which
there is socially insufficient advertising.
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APPENDIX A. MONOPOLY PRICE
In the Hotelling model, given a monopolist at 0 that sets a price 푝, a consumer located
at 푥 is willing to buy if 푠 − 푝 − 푡푥 ≥ 0. If the 푥̃ such that 푠 − 푝 − 푡푥̃ = 0 is less than one
(푥̃ < 1), then the demand the firm faces is 퐷푚 = (푠 − 푝)∕푡 and its profit is (푝 − 푐)(푠 − 푝)∕푡.
Maximizing this with respect to 푝 yields
◦
푝 = (푠+ 푐)∕2, which is the profit-maximizing price
so long as the quantity demanded associated with
◦
푝 is less than 1; else the profit-maximizing
price is 푠 − 푡 (since the firm could then raise its price to 푠 − 푡 without any change in the
demand in its product).
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